other life forms, we can, if we will make the
effort to observe anirrals closely, cane to
understand which ways of life provide them
IlK)re enjoyment and fulfillment, and such
corrunon sensical understanding is all that is
required for the protective reflections carried on in the original position. [12] Therefore, Rawls' analysis of the original position does not provide a basis for refusing to
extend our IlK)ral concern with correcting the
arbitrariness of nature to our relations with
animals.

rests of the weak derives fran our selfinterest and the possibility that we might
becane one of the weak. [11] "There, but for
the grace of God, go II" is the IlK)tive for
fairness in this IlK)ral scheme.
So, it could
be argued that since we need not fear becaning cattle, Rhesus IlK)nkeys, etc., this IlK)tive
cannot be extended to cover our dealings with
anirrals.
In response, we may note that, like
other proposed egoistic origins for IlK)rality,
this one fails to distinguish IlK)rality fran
prudence and does not fit with everyday IlK)ral
psychology. For example, my IlK)ral outrage at

MICHAEL W. FOX

the injustice of the apartheid policies in
South Africa does not derive fran any concern
I have about becoming a South. African black.
There is no IlK)re chance of that happening
than there is· of my becoming a Rhesus IlK)nkey.
In my own case, and I do not think that I am
unusual in this, it is not any sort of selfinterest but something like David Hume' s
"disinterested sent:irnent" or a deontological
sense of fairness being intrinsically valuable which is the origin of my IlK)ral concern
about injustices in South Africa and other
parts of the world remote fran my daily life.
Thus, self-interest does not set the boundaries of our concern with justice.

lEach word expressed an aspect
Of the Mind incarnate
In all things that were named.
Language was sacred and sanctifying.
For in its beginning there was the word
And the living word was God.
In every word that was a name
There was also divinity:
Stone, bone, soil and seed
Were holy things
Like water, fire and wind,
All aspects of the living whole
Whose spirit breathed in sacred places;
In the valleys, deserts, IlK)untains,
Forests, oceans, lakes and rivers,
And in all living things
Called, recalled and known by name.
In the naming of these things
They were incorporated into the human mind,
And the sanctity of being
Was experienced in word and song and prayer.

Similarly, if, as seems to be presumed
in the construction of Rawls' original position, the merely logical possibility that I
might have been born a South African black is
sanehow of importance for developing the
principles of justice which I should respect,
then the same sort of merely logical possibility that I might have been born a Rhesus
IlK)nkey or some other animal should suffice to
extend these principles of justice to animals. Although the "people" in Rawls' original position are gifted with considerable
information and reasoning ability, it does
not follow that their principles of justice
apply only to the informed and the intelligent.
Those principles are to cover even
"the least aIlK)ng us," and this opens the door
to animals being aIlK)ng the possible incarnations which those in the original position
must (logically) be prudentially concerned to
have protected against exploitation. It will
not do to object that we cannot know "what it
is like to be a bat," to use Tool Nagel •s
famous example, and, therefore, cannot determine exactly what is needed to protect animals' interests against abuse.
Even if we
cannot directly experience the pleasures of

Consequently, the egoistic dimension in
Rawls • theory of justice does not provide
good reason to believe that our IlK)ral concern
with protecting the weak against the strong
and other issues of justice must (logically)
be restricted to intra-human relations.
Unless sane other, IlK)rally significant justification can be provided for respecting the
natural order which leaves us the strongest
species, that order is no less arbitrary and
no less in need of correction by principles
of justice than were the "natural" hierarchies envision by Aristotle and the Victorians.
Thus, the apparent unfairness of our
consuming animals is not shown to be ·mere
appearance by the natural contl::act, the natural order, or the idea that animals should
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